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FRENCH NOBLES’ PARTICIPATION IN 
MEDITERRANEAN RELIGIOUS STRUGGLES, 1598-1635
Brian Sandberg 
Northern Illinois University'
This article examines a group of ‘military migrants’, French nobles who engaged in 
Mediterranean maritime warfare, in an attempt to reconsider religious violence in the 
early modern period. The great religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
have often been completely divorced from one another in early modem historiography— 
the Ottoman-Christian wars in the Mediterranean treated separately from the Protestant- 
Catholic conflicts within Europe. French nobles engaged in religious conflict within 
France throughout the long French Religious Wars of 1562-1629, but they also were 
very active in other religious struggles throughout Europe and the Mediterranean. Analyzing 
French nobles’ maritime activities exposes their social networks and their religious activism.
Introduction: A Unified Religious Struggle?
In June 1619, Sebastiano Montelupo wrote from Krakow thanking a Medici 
secretary for ‘the good news that you sent me of the peace in France and of 
the seizure of Turkish vessels by the galleys of the religion of Santo Stefano’. 
Montelupo found this news ‘carissima’ and prayed that God would maintain 
the ‘union’ in France and grant ‘prosperous fortune’ to the galleys.2 
Montelupo’s linkage of religious conflict within France to Christian warfare 
against the Ottoman Empire suggests that he saw these conflicts as aspects 
of a unified religious struggle. Writing from central Europe, Montelupo 
might be expected to confine his vision of religious warfare to the expanding 
conflict within the Holy Roman Empire, which would become the Thirty 
Years’ War, and to the Habsburg warfare on land against the Ottomans. 
Yet even in the heart of central Europe, Mediterranean maritime warfare 
could be perceived as a significant facet of a global religious conflict, as 
Montelupo’s correspondence shows.3
Montelupo’s comparative focus on civil conflict in France in 1619 may 
at first seem curious. The historiography of early seventeenth-century France
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has long portrayed conflicts as unconcerned with religious issues, but instead 
motivated by noble rivalries, opposition to absolutism, or peasant discontent. 
However, new research shows that the 1598 Edict of Nantes was never 
fully implemented and that it hardly ended religious conflict within France.4 
Confessional politics and religious activism continued to shape French nobles’ 
participation in civil conflicts well into the seventeenth century. Thus, when 
members of the French court reacted to the Ottoman sack of Manfredonia 
in 1620, they—like Sebastiano Montelupo—could easily draw connections 
between this disaster and the calamities of civil war in France and Bohemia.5
This article explores the concept of unified religious struggle in the 
early seventeenth century through the experiences of French nobles involved 
in Mediterranean maritime warfare. I argue that examining the ‘military 
migrations’ of French nobles reveals both the religious motives that drew 
them into maritime conflicts and the social networks that they developed 
through their participation in Mediterranean warfare.
Military Migrations
We can better understand the connections between Christian-Muslim and 
Protestant-Catholic religious violence in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries by focusing on the noblemen who organized, financed, and directed 
religious warfare in the Mediterranean. A number of excellent recent studies 
provide increasing detail on the daily lives of sailors and mariners in the 
early modem period, although often emphasizing an Atlantic world maritime 
perspective.6 Many studies probing French nobles’ relationships to maritime 
activities unfortunately still focus either on analyses of royal fleet development 
or on prosopographical excavations of admirals and naval officers.7 Too 
few historians have followed Carla Rahn Philips’s brilliant example in 
constructing a comprehensive analysis of noble officers and the processes 
they used in organizing naval warfare.8
The concept of ‘military migration’ can be useful in problematizing 
nobles’ involvement in early modern maritime operations, especially in 
trans-national contexts.9 Noblemen serving outside of their native lands 
have often been labelled by historians as ‘adventurers’ or ‘mercenaries’.10 
Such characterizations portray nobles as fundamentally self-interested, 
emphasizing economic incentives for warfare while denying the possibility 
that nobles might have had sincere religious motives for engaging in violence. 
Conceiving of extraterritorial service in warfare as ‘military migration’— 
including travels, voyages, extended stays, and permanent residency abroad 
involving military/naval activity—allows us to re-think nobles’ relationships
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with their native society, state institutions, religious bodies, and international 
organizations. The notion of ‘military migration’ allows us to examine 
noble involvement in a broad spectrum of maritime activities and to avoid 
an anachronistic vision of them as ‘naval officers’.
French nobles can thus be effectively considered in the context of a new 
historical literature on early modern maritime history and in comparison 
with various other social groups throughout the Mediterranean that are 
examined in recent studies.” Alan James’s important analysis of French 
naval organization, Navy and Government in Early Modern France, provides 
a fresh perspective on maritime administrative and naval history in seventeenth- 
century France.12 Jean-François Dubost’s work on Italian immigrants to 
France in the early modern period complements these maritime studies and 
permits a closer examination of Franco-Italian exchanges.13
My current research on the cultural history of violence in southern 
France and Tuscany during the early seventeenth century builds on these 
recent studies through an exploration of archival documents, published 
treatises, and printed pamphlets dealing with French ‘military migrants’. A 
combination of manuscript correspondence, regional reports, and noble family 
records conserved in southern French archives départementales, the 
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, and the Archivio di Stato di Firenze 
sheds new light on the role French nobles played in religious warfare in the 
Mediterranean in the early seventeenth century.
Various motives led French nobles to become temporary, itinerate, or 
long-term ‘military migrants’. Early modern noblemen’s education normally 
included international experiences, and many French nobles sought training 
in arms and military skills in Italy during the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth centuries.14 Henri de Gondi, duc de Retz, thus traveled to Florence 
to study Italian and horsemanship at the Medici court.15
Naval tactics, navigational techniques, and maritime experience were 
all valuable skills for early seventeenth-century nobles living along the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic coasts. Henri de Nogaret de La Valette, comte 
de Candalle, served with the Tuscan galleys to gain naval experience in the 
1610s. Maria de’ Medici wrote to Cosimo II de’ Medici that she wanted 
La Vallette ‘to cruise on your galleys . . .  and try to render himself more 
and more capable to serve the king . . .  through naval practice and the 
association with foreigners’.16 Nogaret de La Valette praised the Tuscan 
Granduca’s fleet as the ‘best and most courageous Academy’ for a first 
military experience after his cruise on the Tuscan galleys.17 Members of the 
Schomberg family also sought military and naval education at the Medici 
court.18 Some French nobles sought not only to acquire a generalized maritime
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education, but also to have an apprenticeship in naval command with the 
forces of the Granduca.19
French Nobles and Religious Activism
Nobles living in southern France eagerly offered to serve in Italy when 
wars erupted in Savoy or other Italian states in the early seventeenth century.20 
Some of these military activities have been recognized in the historical 
literature, especially when French and Franco-Italian nobles joined Charles 
de Gonzague, due de Nevers, in his effort to claim the Mantuan succession 
from 1627 to 1631.21 Yet, looking beyond state-sponsored intervention in 
Italy reveals a much wider and more continuous French participation in 
Italian warfare, especially in Mediterranean maritime conflicts and religious 
violence against Islamic enemies.
Members of the Ornano family were active in Corsican maritime activities 
in the early seventeenth century.22 Nobles from Marseilles, Toulon, and 
other southern French ports frequently offered to serve along with Tuscan 
maritime forces.23 French nobles seem to have been closely involved with 
galley-building industries in Toulon, and some of those ships later saw 
service with Italian-led fleets.24 French nobles played important roles in 
financing Mediterranean religious warfare, but their use of informal credit 
mechanisms and patron-client ties often left few traces in archival 
documentation. However, we can occasionally glimpse their loans, debts, 
transactions through their exchanges of jewelry, art objects, and currency.25 
The financing and organization of maritime warfare in this period seems to 
have been linked to religious orders and confraternities, motivated in part 
by what I call ‘piety honour’.26
Religious activism promoted joint maritime initiatives to attack Muslim 
shipping, protect Christian ships and territories from pirates, and defend 
Christianity from Ottoman fleets—most spectacularly at the siege of Malta 
of 1565 and on the Lepanto campaign of 1571. A French noble in the due 
de Retz’s household wrote enthusiastically to the Medici court proposing 
elaborate military operations against the Ottomans in North Africa in the 
early seventeenth century.27 The comte de Joigny coordinated Franco-Tuscan 
naval operations in 1604.28 Giovanni de’ Medici reported on the fitting out 
of a corsair to be sent against the Turks in 1607 by French nobles who 
planned to sail under the ensigns of the Granduca. This ‘large ship’ was to 
be armed with 40 bronze guns and crewed by 300 Frenchmen.29 However, 
a common religious cause could not prevent rivalries and differences from 
threatening the unity of Christian fleets. Medici correspondence reveals the
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friction between Italians and French involved in joint maritime activities in 
the early seventeenth century.30
Religious motives can be discerned in correspondence relating to French 
captives of the Ottoman naval forces and their families attempts to ransom 
them. Some French prisoners of war were eventually re-captured by Christian 
galleys and forced to serve on crews as oarsmen. Maria de’ Medici and 
other members of the French court sought to get such French prisoners 
released through the intervention of the Medici court in the early seventeenth 
century.31
Nobles’ religious convictions and confessional programmes were certainly 
not transparent, instead operating through complex religious-political positions 
and evaluations. Huguenots’ religious motives can be identified in their 
separate expeditions and certain joint activities with Catholic forces. As the 
due de Lesdiguieres and his Huguenot noble followers fought in Savoy in 
the 1610s against Spanish forces and their allies, other French Protestants 
engaged in warfare against Muslims in the Mediterranean.
Toward a History of Mediterranean Noble Networks
Military orders’ bellicose activities promoted the development of broad 
networks amongst Christian nobles throughout the Mediterranean. Members 
of the Order of Saint John of Jerusalem, or knights of Malta, represented an 
international military organization, with significant participation by French 
nobles. The order had become an increasingly visible symbol of the defense 
of Christianity during the sixteenth century, especially following the epic 
siege of Malta itself in 1565 by a powerful Ottoman army and fleet.32 The 
Christian naval victory at Lepanto in 1571 confirmed the status of the 
Mediterranean as a site of Christian renewal, even if the battle’s strategic 
significance was fleeting. Nobles who wanted to display their Christian 
commitment through warfare were attracted to Mediterranean warfare and 
to service with the knights of Malta.
Contacts between French and Italian nobles were arguably especially 
important within the Order of Malta during the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century. Two Medici queens of France reinforced Tuscan-French 
political and social connections in this period. Caterina and Maria de’ 
Medici both facilitated French and Tuscan noblemen’s participation in 
Mediterranean warfare. Jean-François Dubost has found that the greatest 
number of Tuscans served as knights of Malta precisely during the last 
quarter of the sixteenth century.33 Members of many Franco-Italian noble 
families joined the knights of Malta in this period and fought for the Catholic
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cause. During the early seventeenth century, three noblemen from the Franco- 
Italian Elbene family, for example, served as knights of Malta.34
The Ordine di Santo Stefano, or Order of Saint Stephen, also provided 
French nobles with possibilities for service in Mediterranean warfare. Cosimo 
de’ Medici organized this order after receiving papal approval in 1561, 
providing a new naval force to fight against Muslim navies and pirates in 
the Mediterranean. Several of the Florentine noble families who were involved 
in the initial organization of the Ordine di Santo Stefano had close connections 
with France. Bartolomeo Concini completed negotiations with the papacy 
for the foundation of the order, and the Concini family remained active in 
the order. Bartlomeo had two sons who were members of the order, and his 
grandson Concino became Maria de’ Medici’s favourite in the early seventeenth 
century. Domenico Bonsi assisted in the early development of the Ordine 
di Santo Stefano in the 1560s.35 An important branch of the Bonsi family 
soon took control of the bishopric of Beziers in southern France and established 
themselves as Franco-Italian nobles. Such Franco-Italian noble families 
could use their connections with the Ordine di Santo Stefano to enhance 
and expand the existing cultural and social exchanges between Tuscany 
and France. Although the cavalieri, or knights, of the order tended to be 
almost exclusively Tuscan, many French and Franco-Italian nobles joined 
the order’s military-naval expeditions as volunteers to participate in 
Mediterranean warfare against Muslim fleets and shipping.
The Concini and Bonsi families demonstrate how Franco-Italian families 
employed their kinship and client ties through religious orders and maritime 
activities in the Mediterranean area. Many other Franco-Italian noble families 
also developed Mediterranean maritime networks through the financing 
and practice of naval warfare in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries. Members of the Gondi, Orsini, Omando, Rucellai, Strozzi, Gonzaga, 
and Savoie families all seem to have established networks of credit and 
clientage through the organization of Mediterranean warfare.
Conclusion
This brief examination of French maritime activities indicates that French 
nobles were much more involved in early modern Mediterranean religious 
violence than has previously been assumed. Catholic French nobles’ social 
and military networks emerge more clearly from this initial analysis of 
Mediterranean maritime warfare, but there are some indications that Huguenot 
nobles were also active in the Mediterranean. More work needs to be done 
on French nobles, and other Mediterranean ‘military migrants’, to understand
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fully their roles in linking Christian-Muslim warfare with European religious 
struggles. Early seventeenth-century French ‘military migrants’ seem to 
have forged networks across the Mediterranean that promoted broad 
conceptions of an ongoing unified religious conflict.
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